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Abstract  
The paper analyses the potential benefits of marketing cooperatives in Hungary, employing a 
transaction cost economics framework. We found that the purchased quantity, the existence 
of contracts, flexibility and trust are the most important factors farmers consider when selling 
their products via a cooperative. The most striking result is that diversification has positive 
influences on the share of cooperatives in farmers’ sale. Furthermore, farmers with larger 
bargaining power have less willingness to sell their product to the cooperative. Surprisingly, 
asset specificity has rather negative effects on the share of cooperatives in members’ sales.  
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1. Introduction 
The agricultural sector in transition countries can be described by considerable uncertainties. 
In these countries public institutions are ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement. The 
absence of enforceable contracts has made setting up any kind of vertical co-ordination 
difficult. In addition, this creates severe barriers for price discovery involving high 
transaction costs to coordinate market exchanges. In those sub-sectors, where any type of 
production contracts do exist, agricultural producers face hold-up problems (e.g. delayed 
payment for delivered products or ex-post price reduction by retailers). These phenomena are 
reinforced by the emergence of the modern retailing sector, leading to serious problems for 
subsectors dominated by fragmented and small-scale farms, e.g. the horticultural sector. 
Recently there is a growing literature focusing on various governance structures of 
agriculture in the transition countries employing different frameworks (e.g. Gow et al., 2000, 
Dries – Swinnen, 2004, Gorton et al. 2006). Furthermore other papers concentrate on the role 
of contracts in transition agriculture (Boger 2001; Beckmann – Boger 2004). Although there 
is a wealth of literature on producer cooperatives in transition countries (Gardner – Lerman 
2006), but research on the role of marketing cooperatives in transition agriculture is scarce. 
Some relevant papers include Forgács (2008), discussing the importance of leadership of 
cooperatives during transition, through the example of two successful, yet very different 
Hungarian cooperatives (Béke co-op, a traditional one, founded in 1955 and Hajdú Gazdák 
Purchasing and Marketing co-op, operating in its present form since 1999) located in the 
same town. The paper concludes that the more social oriented leadership helped the survival 
of the traditional co-op, whilst the success of the second one depends mostly on the 
accumulated social capital after the radical reforms of the 1990s. Hanf and Török (2009) 
used the example of Mórakert co-op in their paper focusing on the integration of small 
farmers into supply chains. The authors discuss the supply chain network challenges 
agricultural producers face, and the possible solutions various types of co-ops can offer. 
 
This paper tries to contribute to Central and Eastern European literature focusing on the 
benefits and roles co-ops may play in the rapidly changing supply chain management issues. 
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Marketing cooperatives may solve some problems of vertical coordination; however the 
number of cooperatives is still limited in Hungary. In this study, we examine Mórakert 
Purchasing and Service Co-operative, in Mórahalom, county Csongrád, which is located in 
the South-Eastern part of Hungary. With increasing annual turnover and membership, 
Mórakert was a successful co-operative, a good example for solving various coordination 
issues in the Hungarian horticultural sector within an evolving supply chain.  
 
The aim of the paper is to identify the costs and benefits of co-operative membership and 
their explanatory factors using a small-scale survey among co-op members. The remainder of 
the study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview on the development of 
Mórakert cooperative. Section 3 reviews the theoretical background. The survey design and 
the variables are described in section 4 and results are presented in section 5. The last section 
summarises the paper and offers some conclusions on the implications for the market 
mechanisms of Hungary’s horticultural sector. 
 
2. Development of Mórakert cooperative 
In this section we provide a brief description of the development of the Mórakert Purchasing 
and Service Co-operative. The Mórakert co-operative was active in the fruit and vegetable 
sector and it was the first officially acknowledged Producers’ Organisation (PO) in Hungary, 
certified in 2002. It worked as a very successful co-operative (e.g. in terms of increasing 
annual turnover and membership), thus being a good example for a number of emerging 
producer organisations. 
 
In 1993 the Department for Agriculture was established within Mórahalom’s municipality in 
order to help small-holders to submit application forms for various calls for proposals. The 
main incentive for establishing a co-operative was very similar to the Danish tradition: 
economic necessity, arising from the economic and market situation at the beginning of the 
1990s. Therefore, as a first step, an organisation was established to build up countervailing 
power, provide information to farmers and strengthen their negotiation power the against 
retailing and processing industries. 
 
The next step was made in January 1994 by establishing the Common Agricultural and 
Entrepreneurial Society, Mórahalom, as a non-profit organisation, with the aim of organizing 
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small-holders within a loose network. There were 35 founding members of the Society. 
Besides organising and managing joint projects, one of the main activities was the 
coordination of collective purchasing activities. This type of co-ordination was successful, 
and in some cases savings up to 18-20 percent of the purchase cost were achieved. 
 
These joint purchasing activities were extremely successful in decreasing transaction costs, 
e.g. information, negotiation and transportation costs (TCs). However, the main problem this 
organisation could not cope with, was the coordination of the marketing of the small-holders’ 
produce. Therefore, the next step was to set up the Mórakert Purchasing and Service Co-
operative, Mórahalom in April 1995. 
 
About 90 per cent of the products distributed on domestic markets by the co-operative were 
sold to retail chains (Tesco Global, Auchan Hungary, Csemege-Match, SPAR Hungary, 
PROFI Hungary, CORA, CBA etc.). In the first few years of the co-op’s existence the share 
of the retail chains was only about 5-10% of total sales. In the period between 1997-1999 this 
had increased to 90 per cent. To be able to increase the value of the members’ products, the 
co-operative sought export opportunities. 80 percent of the produce purchased from members 
was sold on the domestic market and 20 percent abroad (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
 
The co-operative paid great attention to the quality and homogeneity of their products, whilst 
trying to assure a versatile assortment in order to fulfil the retail chain’s requirements. The 
co-op occasionally bought products on spot markets and sometimes from import too. First 
the products of the members were sold by the co-op, then, if needed, they called for the 
produce of non-member suppliers, and finally – to fulfil the requirements of the consumers 
(e.g. retail chains) – imported products. 
 
One of the main steps to improve the competitiveness on segmented markets was to 
differentiate the products from those of other producers. The co-operative integrated both 
horizontally and vertically the members’ farming activities, and started to focus on higher 
added value activities. The co-operative had a site equipped with full infrastructure. The 
handling, sorting and packaging line for vegetables and fruit was put into operation in 
September 1999. In 2002 a so-called “Agri-logistics Center” was set up by the co-operative 
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that covered 4,000 m
2
 including a cold storage depot, covering 1/4 of the total area. These 
investments were crucial to fulfil the food safety, environmental and hygiene requirements of 
the European Union. The third phase of development was the enlargement of the Agri-
logistics Center with a 6,000 m
2
 storage facility. By June 2006 the co-op was using 15,000 
m
2
 of storage facility. The facilities were fitted with modern sorting and packaging lines, 
enabling the co-op to export up to 20% of its products. Thus all operations (such as 
purchasing, handling, sorting and packaging of products originating from members and other 
suppliers, as well as the storage and transportation activities) were performed in one place. A 
computer supported information system helped the work in the new headquarters. 
 
The main aims of the co-operative were as follows: help farmers to sell their horticultural 
products, purchase input materials on behalf of the co-op members at the most favourable 
prices, and offer long term security. The co-operative extended its membership and circle of 
suppliers during the period between 1995 and 2007 and tried to involve more segments of the 
fruit and vegetable chain. The increase in both membership and the turnover of the co-
operative demonstrates that the co-op was operating efficiently during that period.  
 
The total net revenue of Mórakert co-op reached HUF 8 billion in 2007, a very significant 
result for the sector. However, 2008 and 2009 were not as successful as the previous years, 
e.g. the turnover of the co-op in the first half of 2009 amounted to only 40% of the similar 
period in 2008. They expected a turnover of about HUF 4 billion in 2009, which is only half 
of the result in 2007. The major problems were connected to liquidity: some members did not 
sell their products to the co-operative, but tried to sell them on spot for immediate cash. Such 
short-term thinking and bypassing the co-operative route damaged the marketing channels of 
the co-op. The co-op had 776 owner-members in July 2009. 
 
The success story of Mórakert Co-operative was partly due to the friendly and supportive 
approach of the local authority, the various sources of capital derived from funds for 
development, and above all, the trust and loyalty within the co-operative. However, as the 
co-operative got bigger, and because of the liquidity problems arising from the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008, loyalty and trust have become very sensitive issues. The president 
and the new managing director had to personally approach all of the members in order to 
ensure that they voted for the necessary changes at the assembly of delegates in March 2009 
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(Szabó 2011). As the president of the Mórakert Co-op said: “The retrieval of trust is a matter 
of money” (Hódi 2009).  
 
The most important effects of the liquidity crisis were two-fold:  
1. Huge delays in payments to members and other suppliers (2 billion HUF), 
2. Loans mainly for development (1 billion HUF). 
 
Financial solutions to this liquidity problem in July 2009 came from four sources: a loan 
from the local authority, members’ contributions in different ways, state intervention through 
DATÉSZ Zrt. (private joint stock company) and restructuring of the co-operative into a “for-
profit” organisation (to get reserves and savings in order to finance their development) 
including a cost saving plan and changes in the management. However, in a next stage, the 
co-operative faced a number of additional liquidity problems, decreasing turnover and 
organisational issues. At the end of 2010 it had a debt of HUF 3.6 billion (of which HUF 1.1 
billion towards members-producers). The co-operative is under bankruptcy protection since 
2010 and is very close to ceasing to exist as a co-op. As of January 2012, it is not yet sure 
what kind of integration form will be established on the basis of the huge real estate 
(processing line, cold storage depots etc.) which was partly financed from EU support (Szabó 
2010; 2011).  
 
3. Theoretical considerations  
The recent co-operative literature emphasizes the following main incentives for the 
establishment of co-operatives as a form of vertical integration (VI). First, co-operatives can 
traditionally provide access to, and secure markets for the long term, therefore giving 
protection for independent farmers against the large commercial and/or industrial companies. 
They can also carry out services otherwise not available to producers, or accessible at only 
very high costs. Second, co-operatives build up countervailing power, and above certain 
economies of scale, they act as competitive yardsticks for non-co-operative, conventional 
firms (CF). Third, in some cases co-operatives can increase technological and market 
efficiency and carry out activities with a higher added value. Fourth, co-operatives can 
decrease and internalize transaction (e.g. information) costs, with a better flow of information 
on consumer demand, by creating a closer proximity between consumers and farmers, and 
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with a unified decision making between two or more levels of the marketing channel. The 
co-operative can also decrease both economic and technological uncertainties therefore 
decrease TCs. Using a co-operative as a governance structure also helps avoiding (ex post) 
hold-up problems in the case of perishable products and different types of asset specificities. 
Finally, co-operatives can increase the members’ income by diminishing transaction and 
production costs, and by reimbursing the surplus made at another level of the marketing 
channel to the members. We may conclude that co-operatives can reduce TCs in several 
ways. Transaction costs economics emphasises the role of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
the frequency in inter firm relationships. Because our empirical analysis concentrates only on 
one cooperative active in the fruit and vegetables sectors, we assume that there are no 
significant and systematic differences among farmers in terms of frequency and uncertainty 
of their transactions. Thus, our research focuses on the role of asset specificity in 
relationships between farmers and the cooperative.  
 
Moreover, the previous literature on governance structures in agri-food chains implicitly 
assumes specialised farms in their investigations. But the existence of multiproduct farms 
may affect the form of vertical coordination. Thus, we also investigate the effects of 
production diversification of farms on their decision to sell products via co-operative. 
 
There are several non-economic considerations, which can also be important for the 
successful development of co-operatives (Hakelius 1996). First, co-operatives can be 
considered as “organised trust”, which may affect the success or failure of a co-operative. 
Second, the social and informal network of members or potential members is also relevant as 
a determining factor in decreasing transaction costs and in the process of establishing and 
running the activity of a co-operative. Better knowledge and confidence (Røkholt 1999) 
among members is vital to how co-operatives can be highly efficient in terms of the 
management of human relations, despite lacking the necessary capital to invest. 
 
The following specific hypotheses based on these preceding theoretical considerations will 
be tested.  
 H1: Asset specificity. The share of the co-operative in selling a farmer’s product 
increases with the value of relationship-specific investments. 
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 H2: Complexity. Product complexity and product diversification make searching and 
establishing new partners lengthy, leaky and expensive. Thus, the share of co-
operative in marketing the produce will increase with number of products. 
 H3: Reputation. It is expected that reputation has a positive effect on the share of the 
co-operative in selling products. 
 H4: Bargaining power. Farmers with stronger bargaining power sell less via a co-
operative.  
 
Therefore, the theoretical model is the following: 
Co-operative share = β0 + β1Asset specificity + β2Complexity + β3Reputation + 
β4Bargaining)         (1) 
 
The expected signs of the variables are as follows: 
β1>0, β2>0, β3>0 and β4<0.   
 
4. Survey design  
The questionnaire was prepared in consultation with the management of Mórakert Co-
operative. 136 questionnaires were distributed, but after cleaning the data, the total number 
of observations for analysis was reduced to 107. Table 1 and Table 2 present the descriptive 
statistics identifying the average cooperative members’ profile and their production structure. 
In order to facilitate the comparison across the different variables, we use the coefficient of 
variation, defined as the ratio of standard deviation to the mean instead of simple standard 
deviation. 
 
The average co-operative member’s farm size is 15 hectares of land, whilst 30% of them rent 
extra land as well. The coefficient of variation (2.63) and the maximum and minimum values 
corresponding to the total land used emphasise the homogeneity of the producers. The 
second row of Table 1 shows the group of producers using extra land being rather 
heterogeneous, renting small plots (4.6 hectares on average, with 4.29 coefficient of 
variation). 95% of members use family labour, whilst 36% employ paid labour (1.3 people 
on average) as well. In line with the farm size indicators discussed above, the coefficient of 
variation of paid labour is also rather high (with larger farms employing more paid labour, 
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maximum 15 people). Turning to the average age (46 on average, the youngest member is 
22, the oldest 68), the group is more homogeneous with a low coefficient of variation. 
 
Table 1. Profile of co-operative members 
Indicators Mean Coefficient of variation Min. Max. 
Total land (ha) 15.3 2.69 0 350 
Land rented (ha) 4.6 4.29 0 150 
Full time family labour (person) 2.5 0.89 0 21 
Paid labour (person) 1.3 2.06 0 15 
Age (years) 45.7 0.21 22 68 
Education (1 lowest, 9 highest) 3.6 0.35 1 8 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
Table 2. Production structure and the link with the cooperative 
Indicators Mean Coefficient of 
variation 
Min. Max. 
Vegetable varieties produced 3.3 0.68 0 12 
Fruit varieties produced 0.4 2.26 0 5 
Co-op membership (years) 4.6 0.48 0.5 11 
Share of vegetable production sold through co-
op (%) 
69.0 
0.49 
0 100 
Share of fruit production sold through co-op 
(%) 
14.2 
2.24 
0 100 
Share of potato production sold through co-op 
(%) 
30.3 1.36 
 
0 100 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
The lower coefficient of variation indicators in Table 2 suggest that the production structure 
and the importance of cooperative for the members are more homogenous than the average 
member’s profile. 85% of those interviewed produce vegetables (on average 3 varieties), 
whilst 22% produce fruits (on average 2 varieties). The largest share of production is sold 
through the cooperative for vegetables (69 per cent), with a low variation across members. 
Finally, the newest cooperative members joined a year ago, whilst some were present from 
the beginning. On average, members joined the cooperative 4 years ago.  
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5. Results 
The empirical analysis is conducted in two stages. First, we focus on the importance of 
various factors in the choice of the co-operative, employing multivariate statistical analysis. 
Second, we investigate the share of co-operative in the selling of various products applying 
transaction costs economics framework.  
 
5.1. Reasons for choice of the co-operative 
The respondents sold 59% of vegetables, 21% of fruits and 33% of potatoes via Mórakert co-
operative. Thirty four percent of farmers sold their output to co-operative only, 50% sold to 
between two and six buyers, the remainder sold to more than ten buyers. The majority of 
respondents are individual farms or family farms (97%), the remainder are partnerships and 
co-operatives. Thirty four percent of farmers sell only one product and 39% sell at least five 
products. Thirty three percent of individual and family farms sell only one product.  
 
The theme concerned with potential benefits of co-operative membership employed a 13-
item scale that measured the importance of these features in a co-operative choice context (1 
= not at all important, 7 = very important). Figure 1 shows the importance in descending 
order attached by producers to various marketing factors for sales through the co-operative. 
The most important factors for selling via the co-operative are quantity, existence of contract, 
flexibility and trust. Interestingly, habit, price premium, speed of payment and bargaining 
power issue are unimportant factors. Furthermore, services (input finance, delivery) provided 
by the co-operative are also not too important factors for farmers.  
 
Figure 1: Importance of various factors in choosing the co-operative (1 - not important; 7 - 
very important) 
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Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
We apply canonical correlation analysis to determine the effects of producers’ links to 
cooperative on their perception of benefits from the cooperative. The links of producers to 
the cooperative are specified as the set of dependent variables, while farmers’ rating on 
factors as a reason to sell through the cooperative are designated as the set of independent 
variables. We focus only on the most important factors identified by farmers as a reason to 
sell their products via cooperative. The seven variables resulted in a 13-to-1 ratio of 
observations to variables exceeding the thumb rule of ten observations per variable (Hair et 
al. 1998).  
 
Our estimations produced 2 canonical functions with their canonical correlations presented in 
Table 3. The first and second canonical correlations were 0.44, and 0.35, respectively. The F 
value of canonical functions revealed that the significance of both canonical functions 
exceeds the critical value at the 0.10 level. Multivariate test statistics also supported that the 
two functions fit the data well. The use of a single criterion to decide on whether or not a 
canonical function should be included in the interpretation is so restrictive that the 
redundancy index needs to be examined in addition to the level of significance. It is 
important to interpret only those canonical functions that explain a large proportion of 
independent variables.  
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Table 3. Measures of overall model fit and multivariate tests of significance 
Canonical function Canonical correlation F P value 
1 0.440 2.269 0.007 
2 0.345 1.940 0.083 
Tests of significance of all canonical correlations 
 Statistic F P value 
Wilks’ lambda 0.709 2.269 0.007 
Pillai’s trace 0.313 2.281 0.006 
Lawley-Hotelling trace 0.376 2.256 0.007 
Roy’s largest root 0.240 2.957 0.008 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
Table 4 summarises the redundancy index analysis for reasons of choice of cooperative 
marketing. The results indicate that total redundancy index was 0.15, meaning that 15% of 
the variance in choice related variables set was explained. More specifically, the first 
canonical function explained 41.3%, whiles the second 35.3% of total redundancy. In other 
words, the two functions together contributed most to the total redundancy. The findings 
from both statistical significance tests and the redundancy analysis indicate that both 
canonical functions should be interpreted as the solution. In sum, there exists a strong 
relationship between the farmers’ links to cooperative and their perception on the potential 
reasons to join to the cooperative. 
 
Table 4. Canonical redundancy index analysis 
Canonical function Variance extracted in 
trade variables 
Canonical 
R
2
 
Redundancy 
index 
Proportion of 
redundancy (%) 
1 0.117 0.194 0.081 41.3 
2 0.115 0.119 0.069 35.3 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
Table 5 presents the standardized canonical coefficients for the first two dimensions across 
both sets of variables. For the links with cooperative variables, the first canonical dimension 
is strongly influenced by both the total share of selling via the co-operative (0.83) and years 
of membership (-0.80). Interestingly, among independent variables trust and personal contact 
have high negative coefficients, whilst among the benefits from co-operative price and 
quantity positively related to the links with cooperative. On the second function, the highest 
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coefficient was the year of membership. Among independent variables, the existence of 
contract has the highest coefficient (0.94), followed by a high negative coefficient of trust (-
0.59). Hence, the year of membership was positively affected by the contract, but was 
hampered by trust. 
 
Table 5. Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
Variables Dimension 
 1 2 
Dependent variables: Links with cooperative    
Years of membership -0.798  0.655 
Total share of selling via cooperative 0.833 0.609 
Independent variables: Reasons of choice   
Quantity  0.503 0.280 
Contract  0.094 0.938 
Flexibility  0.078 -0.209 
Trust  -0.471 -0.591 
Personal contact -0.754 0.103 
Price  0.577 -0.538 
Services  0.469 0.112 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
5.2. The share of co-operative selling 
In this section we test the hypotheses of transaction cost economics related to the share of 
products marketed by the co-operative. Our variables are the following: 
 Dependent variable: SHARE, ranging between 0 and 100 per cent.  
 Explanatory variables: 
o Physical asset specificity. Horticultural production’s physical asset specificity 
is captured by two variables: 1) area of plastic tunnel (PLASTIC); 2) irrigated 
area (IRRIGATED).  
o Human asset specificity measure as: 1) age of farmers (AGE), and 2) farmers’ 
highest level of education (EDUCATION).  
o Finally, we add the length of co-op membership (in years), as a proxy for 
relation specific asset (MEMBER YEAR). Being a cooperative member for 
longer may imply a positive expectation on benefits from cooperative. 
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o Complexity and diversification. Production diversity is measured by the 
number of products in horticultural production (DIVERSIFICATION). 
o Reputation. It is difficult to quantify reputation in a postal questionnaire; we 
used two proxies for measuring reputation. We asked about the reasons for 
selling product via co-operative. The respondents evaluated the importance of 
specific factors, including trust (TRUST) and personal contact (PCONTACT) 
on a seven points-scale.  
o Bargaining power. We apply two proxies for bargaining power: 1) number of 
buyers (BUYERS), and 2) farmers who have no other option to sell their 
product (NO OPTION)  
 
We estimate our model on total sales separately for each product. We report only the best 
results in terms of our a priori expectations and statistical significance. Table 6 shows our 
estimations for total sales. Interestingly, results indicate that asset specificity variables have 
been significant and unexpected. The DIVERSIFICATION and MEMBER YEAR variables 
have expected signs but they are not significant. This suggests that farmers producing more 
products sell more via co-operative. The reputation variable (TRUST) is not significant. 
Finally, the negative and significant coefficient of BUYERS suggests that farmers with larger 
bargaining power sell fewer products via cooperative. 
 
Table 6. Tobit regression results for the share of co-operative selling in total sales 
 Share of the co-operative 
IRRIGATION  -0.000* 
EDUCATION  -0.036** 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.052*** 
TRUST  0.002 
MEMBER YEAR 0.008 
BUYERS  -0.003** 
CONSTANT  0.275** 
Pseudo R2  0.418 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
The estimated coefficients of a Tobit regression for vegetables are presented in Table 7. The 
estimations indicate that asset specificity variables are significant, but have unexpected sign. 
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The reputation variable (TRUST) is significant with expected signs. It indicates that the 
growing reputation leads to larger share products being sold by the co-operative. The 
complexity variable (DIVERSIFICATION) has expected signs with significance. This 
suggests that farmers producing more products sell more via the co-operative. Similarly to 
the previous estimation, the coefficient of BUYERS is significant implying that farmers with 
stronger bargaining power use the cooperative less. 
 
Table 7. Tobit results for the share of co-operative selling in total vegetable sales 
 Share of co-operative 
IRRIGATION  -0.001* 
EDUCATION  -0.122*** 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.033** 
TRUST  0.047* 
MEMBER YEAR 0.034* 
BUYERS  -0.007*** 
CONSTANT  0.744*** 
Pseudo R
2 
0.3571 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
The fruit model yields less promising results (Table 8). The estimations indicate that asset 
specificity variables are not significant with an unexpected sign for IRRIGATION and the 
expected sign for EDUCATION. The complexity variable (DIVERSIFICATION) is 
significant with expected sign. This suggests again that farmers with wider product 
assortments sell more via co-operative.  
 
Table 8. Tobit results for the share of co-operative selling in total fruit sales 
 Share of co-operative 
IRRIGATION  -0.000 
EDUCATION  0.162 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.305*** 
PCONTACT  -0.185 
MEMBER YEAR 0.031 
BUYERS  0.009 
CONSTANT -2.523* 
Pseudo R
2
  0.2015 
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Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
Estimations for potato sales are presented in Table 9. The asset specificity variables have 
unexpected signs and they are also significant. We find that complexity is positively and 
significantly related to the share of co-operative selling. The reputation (PCONTACT) 
variable is not significant with an unexpected sign. It indicates that trust yields a larger share 
of co-operative in selling of products. The bargaining power variables have expected signs 
without significance. 
 
Table 9. Tobit results for the share of co-operative selling in total potato sales 
 Share of co-operative 
IRRIGATION  -0.007* 
EDUCATION  -0.274* 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.286*** 
PCONTACT  -0.000 
MEMBER YEAR 0.165* 
NO OPTION  -0.114 
CONSTANT  -0.209 
Pseudo R
2
  0.2430 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Own estimations based on the survey 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the potential benefits and costs of the marketing cooperatives in 
Hungary, employing a transaction cost economics framework. The results presented add to 
the literature on the marketing cooperatives in transition agriculture. Although there are 
similar co-operatives in the Hungarian horticultural sector, our example, the Mórakert co-
operative was the most successful. We found that the quantity, the existence of contract, 
flexibility and trust are the most important factor for farmers when deciding to sell their 
product via the co-operative. It is noteworthy that direct benefits from the cooperative, 
including the speed of payment, price incentives, delivery, input finance play less important 
roles. Canonical correlation shows a strong relationship between farmers’ links with the co-
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operative and the most important reasons for choosing to join to the co-operative and sales to 
the co-operative. 
 
In the next step we focused exclusively on the sales to the cooperative, introducing additional 
variables based on transaction cost theory. Tobit estimations yielded rather diverse results for 
each product groups with respect to our a priori theoretical expectations. We obtained good 
results for vegetable produce. One of the reasons may be that vegetable products are the most 
important items for farmers selling via a co-operative. The hypothesis on the positive 
relationship between asset specificity and the share of co-operative selling is not confirmed. 
These results can be explained partly by the weakness of usual proxies for measuring 
physical and human asset specificity. The irrigation and education variables may have rather 
broader relevance especially in terms of access to better factor endowments and/or 
technology of farms. Thus, we can argue that farms with better technology are likely able to 
establish business relationships outside of the co-operative, implying larger farm size and 
more bargaining power for them. Consequently, these farms likely sell less product groups to 
the co-operative. Our results provide more support to the positive link between 
diversification and the share of co-operative selling. Data also reveals that farmers in our 
sample are less specialised, their risk management is based mainly on the traditional 
multiproduct peasant farm strategy. Surprisingly, we found that reputation has a positive 
effect upon total sales to the co-operative for vegetables only. This outcome can be explained 
by the fact of being a member of the co-operative implies a strong commitment to the co-
operative. Farmers with longer periods of membership sell more products via the co-
operative. Finally, the bargaining power of farms is negatively related to the share of co-
operative selling.  
 
The results also shed light on some of the co-ops’ limitations. Whilst the co-operative 
successfully integrates the small scale farms into the globalised market, larger and probably 
more efficient farms sell just a smaller fraction of their product to the cooperative causing 
difficulties to fulfil quantity requirements of the cooperative’s contract with its buyers. 
 
The limitations of our research are inherent in the case study approach. Our results cannot be 
generalised across all cooperatives in Hungary due to differences in geographical location 
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and commodity handled. Thus, further research is needed to clarify the costs and benefits of 
marketing cooperatives. 
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